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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we investigate how important a firm’s proximity to the industry debt ratio is to 
its stock price performance. To achieve this goal, event study methodology is applied on stock 
price reactions upon the announcement of seasoned equity offerings. Depending on whether 
the offering moves the debt ratio of the firms “closer to” or “away from” the industry median 
leverage ratio, the average cumulative abnormal returns are different. Empirical tests on the 
significance and comparison of the average cumulative abnormal returns are conducted. After 
controlling for other factors which may affect stock price reactions to seasoned equity 
offerings, we find that firms moving their leverage ratio closer to industry median have less 
negative stock price reactions compared to those moving away from it. We therefore conclude 
that investors see industry median leverage ratios as a benchmark for firms within that 
industry. 
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1. Introduction 
The choice of capital structure, the combination of debt and equity used to 
finance the activities of a firm, is one of the most important financial decisions that the 
management of a firm has to make. Therefore, it is not surprising that this topic has received a 
lot of attention in financial literature. Starting with the pioneering work of Modigliani and 
Miller (1958), which laid the foundation for future studies, several competing theoretical 
models have been developed that try to identify the main factors that affect a firm’s choice of 
financial structure. For example, the traditional trade-off theory sees the choice of capital 
structure as a trade-off between the benefits and costs of increasing debt. The pecking order 
theory sees it as the result of asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders, whereas 
the market timing theory sees capital structure as the result of past attempts by the firm’s 
management to time the equity market. The predictions of these theories are often not 
consistent with each other.  
To judge whether a change in capital structure increases or decreases firm value, 
stock price reaction can be an effective tool. There are many models that try to predict the 
effect that changes in a firm’s financial leverage will have on its stock price. Furthermore, 
since changes in leverage are often the result of security issues, many articles have studied the 
stock price reaction to the announcement of security offerings.  
However, this paper will focus on an area that has received relatively little 
attention in this body of literature: the importance of median industry debt ratios. Previous 
empirical studies have found that differences in leverage ratios are greater across industries 
than within industries, but few studies have investigated the link between industry debt ratios 
and stock price performance.  
The main objective of our paper is to investigate how important a firm’s 
proximity to the industry debt ratio is to its stock price performance. To achieve this, we will 
use event study methodology to analyse stock price reaction to announcements of seasoned 
equity offerings. If investors see industry debt ratios as somehow desirable, we would expect 
the stock price to react better to an announced offering that will move the firm’s leverage ratio 
closer to the industry median, as opposed to an issuance that will move the firm’s leverage 
ratio away from the industry median.  
We are motivated to undertake this study for several reasons. 
Firstly, surveys of practitioners suggest that firms do pay attention to industry 
debt ratios. Scott and Johnson (1982) surveyed 212 CFOs of Fortune 1000 companies. They 
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found that comparisons with leverage ratios of industry competitors have some impact on the 
determination of leverage targets. In addition, most respondents affirmed that they used the 
concept of industry norm in arriving at a financing decision. Graham and Harvey (2001), in 
analysing the results of their survey of 392 CFOs, concluded that rival debt ratios are 
relatively important for regulated companies, Fortune 500 companies, public companies, and 
firms that target their debt ratio. They also noted that respondents consider credit ratings 
important for debt decisions and that industry debt ratios are an important input to credit 
ratings. Our study can help answer the question whether this emphasis put on industry 
leverage ratios by managers is indeed justified.  
Secondly, if we find evidence that proximity to the industry median ratio does 
affect the market value of the firm’s equity, it could be argued that the industry median serves 
as some sort of optimal capital structure for firms in a given industry. As will be shown in 
more detail in the literature review section of our paper, there is currently no consensus in 
literature as to whether an optimal capital structure that maximizes the value of the firm 
exists. The traditional trade-off and the dynamic trade-off theories argue in favour of the 
concept of an optimal capital structure, whereas the pecking order theory, market timing 
theory and managerial inertia theory argue against it.  
Thirdly, although a lot of studies have focused on comparing leverage ratios 
across industries and within industries, there are very few previous studies investigating the 
link between industry debt ratios and stock price performance. Billingsley, Smith and Lamy 
(1994) and Hull (1999) have conducted studies similar to ours using data from the 1970-s and 
1980-s. However, this is the first study that looks at the link between industry debt ratios and 
stock price performance while controlling for business cycle effects. In addition to this, our 
data sample extends over the period 2004 – 2008 and therefore our results are based on more 
recent data than the two studies mentioned above. Also, unlike Hull (1999), we do not limit 
our sample to stock-for-debt transactions1, but include in our sample equity offerings where at 
least part of the proceeds will be used to reduce outstanding debt.  
The rest of our paper is organized as follows: the second section reviews the 
relevant literature on the subject, the third section describes our data and methodology, the 
fourth section presents and interprets our empirical results, whereas the last section concludes.  
 
 
                                                 
1 A stock-for-debt transaction is one in which all of the proceeds from an equity issue are used to reduce 
outstanding debt.  
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2. Literature Review 
In this section we shall review the main theories on capital structure, the 
literature on the significance of industry leverage ratios and two studies that explore the link 
between industry debt ratios and stock price reaction to security offerings.  
 
2.1 Theories on Capital Structure 
The starting point in the area of capital structure literature is the seminal paper 
of Modigliani and Miller (1958). According to this article, in a perfect capital market, the way 
in which you finance a company does not have an impact on the value of the firm. This is 
known as the capital structure irrelevance theory. Ever since then, research on the topic of 
capital structure has been expanded, by relaxing the restrictive assumptions of a perfect 
capital market set by Miller and Modigliani. For financial structure to matter, market 
imperfections, such as taxes, transaction cost, and information asymmetry should be taken 
into consideration.  
Generally speaking, there are five principal theories that aim to explain the 
puzzle around capital structure. They are presented below: 
 
The Traditional Trade-off Theory 
According to this theory, firms reach an optimal capital structure by trading off 
the benefits and costs of taking up more debt.  
On one hand, taking up more debt means more tax advantages since the interest 
expense is tax deductable (Modigliani and Miller, 1963). In addition, taking on more debt can 
mitigate the agency problem between managers and shareholders. As Jensen and Meckling 
pointed out in their 1976 article, since managers do not capture the entire gain from their 
value-enhancing activities, but they do bear the entire cost, the interest of the managers is 
different from that of the shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Managers, therefore, 
have an incentive to use the free cash flow available to them to serve their own interests, by 
engaging in “empire building” and consuming “private perks”. Debt can mitigate the problem 
of free cash flow because the periodical interest payments reduce the cash flow under the 
control of the managers. (Jensen, 1986). 
On the other side, taking up more debt also increases the direct and indirect cost 
of financial distress. Direct costs include the court and legal fees incurred when a firm 
declares bankruptcy. Indirect costs refer to increased maintenance costs borne by customers in 
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the event of firm liquidation. These costs affect the price that the firm can charge for its 
products and depend on the probability of liquidation (Titman, 1984). In addition, taking up 
more debt will create conflicts between debt-holders and equity-holders, specifically, the risk 
shifting (asset substitution) and the under-investment problems. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
argue that when the leverage of the firm increases, equity-holders tend to pursue riskier 
strategies. The reason lies behind the notion that the riskier the underlying asset, the more 
valuable the equities. To put it in another way, equity-holders will expropriate wealth from 
the debt-holders when leverage increases. Myers (1977) pointed out another agency cost of 
debt: underinvestment. He observed that highly levered firms are more likely to pass up 
profitable projects since the profit will probably be used to pay down debt. 
 
The Pecking Order Theory 
 According to this theory, there is no such thing as optimal capital structure and 
when it comes to financing decisions, internal funding is preferred to debt and debt is 
preferred to equity (Myers, 1984). 
 The main argument here is the information asymmetry theory. Managers are 
supposed to have more information than outside investors. “The news conveyed by an issue is 
bad or at least less good” since outsiders know that the “cost of issuing equity at a bargain 
price may outweigh the good project’s NPV”. Aware of this, outsiders are willing to pay less 
for the issue, which in turn affects managers’ decision of issue (Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
Debt and internal funding do not have the problems of negative signaling. In addition, the 
transaction costs of internal funding are the lowest, followed by debt issuances and finally 
equity issuances. 
 
The Dynamic Trade-Off Theory 
 The dynamic trade-off theory is a compromise between the traditional trade-off 
theory and the pecking order theory. The optimal debt ratio is not a static and fixed point, but 
a range within which the debt ratio of the firm varies. According to Fischer, Heinkel and 
Zechner (1989), depending on firm-specific properties, such as size, risk, tax rate and 
bankruptcy costs, different firms allow the actual leverage to deviate from the target ratio for 
different amounts. Transaction costs play an important role in this theory. Firms whose 
leverage ratio does not coincide with its target debt ratio will do an adjustment only when the 
benefit of doing so outweighs the costs.  
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The Market Timing Theory 
  According to this theory, firms are more likely to issue equity when the market 
value of the firm’s equity is high and to repurchase equity when the market value is low. The 
current capital structure of a firm is the cumulative effect of past attempts to time the equity 
market. (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). Market timing theory predicts that an equity offering will 
be preceded by a period of positive abnormal returns and that the stock price will drop after 
the announcement of the offering (Lucas and McDonald, 1990). According to this theory, 
there is no optimal capital structure because the debt to equity ratio will change whenever 
there is a market timing behavior.  
 
The Managerial Inertia Theory 
According to this theory, firms do not issue or repurchase equity or debt to 
counteract the change of financial structure induced by stock price changes. Instead, managers 
let the companies experience different capital structures through the change of stock price. 
According to this theory, taxes, bankruptcy costs and market timing do not explain much of 
the changes in capital structure when stock price is taken into account. High market to book 
value is thus usually accompanied by a small debt ratio. According to this theory, there is no 
optimal leverage ratio (Welch, 2004). 
 
2.2 Literature on Industry Leverage Ratios 
 
Evidence on the Significance of Industry Leverage Ratios 
Schwartz and Aronson (1967) found that differences in leverage ratios within 
industry groups are statistically insignificant, whereas differences in leverage ratios across 
industry groups are statistically significant. They also observed that average industry ratios 
are quite stable over time. However, it must be noted that this study classified industry groups 
in a very broad way: mining, railroads, utilities and industrials.  
Scott (1972), using a sample that covered a broader range of industries and 
excluded regulated firms, made findings compatible with those of Schwartz and Aronson 
(1967). He observed a tendency for leverage ratios to cluster within industries and argued that 
this provided evidence in support of the concept of an optimal capital structure. Scott 
attributed changes in leverage ratios across industries to different degrees of business risk.  
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Scott and Martin (1975) using a sample covering 12 industries found that 
differences in industry leverage ratios are significant even when controlling for firm size. 
They concluded that industry classification is a determinant of financial structure.  
Bowen, Daley and Huber (1982) found that firms show a statistically significant 
tendency to move toward the mean industry leverage over time. Like the studies mentioned 
above, they too found evidence of significant differences in financial structures across 
industries. They also found evidence that, at the industry level, the level of debt used by firms 
depends in part on the level of non-debt tax shields provided by depreciation, investment tax 
credits and operating tax loss carry-forwards.  
Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984) also found strong industry influences on firm 
leverage ratios, by relying on cross-sectional regressions of firm leverage on industry 
classification dummies. They found that industry classification explained 54% of the variation 
in firm leverage. R2 was smaller but still considerable (25%) if regulated firms were excluded 
from the sample. They interpreted these and other results as evidence on the existence of an 
optimal capital structure.  
In contrast to the above-mentioned studies, Mackay and Philips (2005) found 
that in competitive manufacturing industries, most of the variation in financial leverage arises 
within industries, rather than between industries. They explain these results by relying on 
industry-equilibrium models that stress the importance of a firm’s position within the industry 
and its interactions with other firms within the industry. Although they do find evidence that 
firms revert very slowly to median industry leverage, they argue that this does not mean that 
firms’ trend toward the industry norm. One explanation they offer for the slow reversion is 
that, it could be the equilibrium outcome of firms within the same industry making different 
and persistent choices about their financing, technology and risk.  
According to the static industry equilibrium model proposed by Maksimovich 
and Zechner (1991), industry leverage ratios will vary widely even within industries. Their 
model analyses agency problems of debt at the industry level (instead of the individual firm 
level) and looks at the interaction between leverage and technology choice.  
 
Industry Leverage Ratios and Stock Price Reaction to Security Offerings  
Billingsley, Smith and Lamy (1994) studied simultaneous debt and equity 
issuances by comparing them to unaccompanied equity and debt issuances. As expected, they 
found that the market’s reaction to all these issuances was negative. However, abnormal 
returns were less negative when the announced issuance would move the firm closer to the 
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industry mean leverage. Interestingly, although deviations from industry average were 
significant in explaining abnormal returns, deviations from the firm’s own (historical) average 
debt ratio were not.  
Hull (1999), studied stock price reaction to 338 stock-for-debt transactions 
covering the period 1970 – 1988. He too found that abnormal returns were less negative when 
a transaction would move the company closer to the industry median debt ratio. His empirical 
results are more robust than those of Billingsley, Smith and Lamy (1994), because he controls 
for several other offering characteristics, such as the size of the offering, the stock 
performance prior to the offering etc. However, one variable Hull fails to control for is the 
effect of business cycles.  
 
3. Methodology 
In this section we describe in detail our methodology. As was mentioned in the 
introductory section, we will be using event study methodology to determine whether the 
changes in leverage relative to the industry median influence the stock price reaction to an 
equity offering. Our methodology is quite similar to that used by Hull (1999). Section 3.1 
describes our data sample; Section 3.2 defines the event and describes how abnormal returns 
are calculated; Section 3.3 describes the methodology of our parametric and non-parametric 
tests; whereas Section 3.4 describes how the cross sectional regression is conducted.  
 
3.1 Data 
Our data consists of a sample of 75 seasoned equity offerings by U.S. firms, 
extending over the period 2004 – 2008. Offerings are identified by referring to Investment 
Dealers’ Digest (Securities in Registration section) published in the first week of each month.  
We include in our sample only those offerings for which the prospectus filed with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) explicitly states that a certain portion of the net 
proceeds will be used to reduce the company’s outstanding debt. This is done to insure that 
the change in leverage caused by the offering will be substantial enough. Given the relatively 
small size of our sample, a question does arise as to how representative our sample is of the 
U.S. market. To mitigate this risk we have tried to find observations that are distributed 
through time as uniformly as possible, and that represent as many industries as possible2. 
                                                 
2 Financial firms were the only sector that we deliberately excluded from our sample. It is common practice to 
exclude financial firms from studies about leverage since they are heavily regulated.   
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Tables 1 and 2 present the breakdown of our sample by year and industry (Datastream 
classification), respectively: 
 
Year No. of observations Sector No. of observations
2004 23 1. Aerospace & Defense 4
2005 30 2. Automobiles & Parts 2
2006 13 3. Electronic & Electrical Equipment 5
2007 3 4. Food & Drug Retailers 1
2008 6 5. Gas, Water & Multiutilities 3
Total 75 6. General Industrials 1
7. General Retailers 5
8. Health Care Equipment & Services 9
9. Household Goods & Home Construction 1
10. Industrial Engineering 3
11. Industrial Metals & Mining 1
12. Industrial Transportation 4
13. Media 2
14. Oil & Gas Producers 3
15. Oil Equipment & Services 8
16. Personal Goods 4
17. Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 1
18. Software & Computer Services 3
19. Support Services 5
20. Technology Hardware & Equipment 5
21. Travel & Leisure 5
Total 75
Table 1. Frequency distribution by year Table 2 Frequency distribution by industry
 
 
The stocks of the companies in our sample are listed on the following 
exchanges: NYSE (20 observations), NASDAQ (49 observations), American Stock Exchange 
(4 observations) and NASDAQ Capital Market (2 observations). Figure A1 in the appendix 
shows the performance of the composite indices for each of these markets for the years 2004-
2008. During the period 2004-2007 there appears to be a general upward trend in the stock 
market. However, the performance of the stock market deteriorates dramatically in 2008. This 
can also be noticed on Table 3, which shows the yearly percentage change for each of the 
market indices. For the years 2004 through 2007 the yearly changes are positive for all the 
indices (with the exception of Nasdaq Capital Market in 2007), whereas in 2008 each of the 
indices has lost at least 40% of its value.  
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Table 3 Yearly Changes for the Market Indices 
Year NYSE NASDAQ AMEX Nasdaq Capital 
2004 12.6% 8.6% 22.2% n/a
2005 8.0% 2.5% 24.8% n/a
2006 17.9% 9.5% 16.9% n/a
2007 6.6% 9.8% 17.2% -11.7%
2008 -40.9% -40.5% -42.0% -53.6%  
For each firm in the sample, we calculate the ratio of book value of debt to 
market value of equity using financial data from the prospectus and/or from the most recent 
quarterly filing with the SEC prior to the offering. We denote this ratio D/Epre. We then use 
the information contained in the prospectus to estimate the new D/E ratio that will result after 
the equity offering. We denote this ratio D/Epost.  
To classify our firms into their respective industries we rely on the system of 
sector classification used by Datastream. The industry D/E ratio is computed as the median of 
the D/E ratios of all the firms in a given industry at the most recent year-end date prior to the 
announced offering. We denote the median industry D/E ratio as D/Eind.  
We then calculate the expected change in the D/E ratio, relative to the industry 
median, that will result due to the equity offering for each of the firms in the sample. 
Following Hull (1999), we denote this variable as CDE and define it as follows: 
CDE = | D/Epre - D/Eind | - | D/Epost - D/Eind | 
It must be noted that, CDE takes a positive value if the offering is expected to move the D/E 
ratio of the firm closer to the industry median and a negative value if the offering is expected 
to move leverage away from the industry median. We then divide our sample in two groups: 
the “closer to” group and the “away from” group. In the former group, we include 
observations for which the value of the CDE variable is positive, whereas in the latter group 
we include observations for which the value of the CDE variable is negative. This results in 
51 observations being classified in the “closer to” group and 24 observations being classified 
in the “away from” group. Table 4 presents a more detailed breakdown of the observations for 
each group: 
Table 4 Number of observations in each group 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 t ot al  
"away from"group 8 12 2 1 1 24
"closer to"group 15 18 11 2 5 51  
 
For each of the offerings in our sample we also gather information on the planned proceeds of 
the offering, whether the debt being reduced is bank debt or not, and whether the offering is a 
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combination primary-secondary offering. Of the 75 observations, 57 involve repayment of 
bank debt and 40 out of the 75 offerings are combination offerings. The source for this 
information is the prospectus filed by each firm with the SEC. In addition, for each firm, 
historical stock price data is obtained from Datastream. Table 5 shows summary statistics of 
our data sample: 
Table 5 Summary Statistics for the data sample 
Proceeds* Debt Repayment* D/Epre D/Epost D/Eind
Min. 6,05                           0,92                                        0,0074               -                      0,0161                
Max. 390,10                       390,10                                    2,7570               2,0085                0,9915                
Median 55,80                         37,20                                      0,3237               0,2039                0,1178                
Average 75,38                         61,53                                      0,4570               0,2740                0,1607                
St. Dev. 65,36                         82,44                                     0,4519             0,3430               0,1648               
*in million US Dollars  
 
3.2 Event Definition and Calculation of Abnormal Returns 
Our event date (t = 0) is the date on which the planned equity offering is first 
announced to the market. This date should correspond to the date on which the firm files a 
prospectus with the SEC about the offering. Our event window stretches from day t = –3 to 
day t = +3.  In our judgement, this 7-day event window is broad enough to remove any 
uncertainty about the announcement date.  
Our estimation window starts on day t = +21 and ends on day t = +160. Therefore, 
its length is 140 days. It is a common practice for event studies of seasoned equity offerings to 
set the estimation window after the event date, since equity offerings are usually preceded by 
periods of good stock-market performance (Korwar and Masulis, 1986; Choe, Masulis and 
Nanda, 1993; Hull, 1999). Figure 1 gives a graphical representation of our event window and 
estimation window.  
 
Figure 1 
 Event Window Estimation Window  
 
 
 
    -3        0       +3               +21                                                               +160  
To compute the abnormal returns, normal returns are first calculated. We use the 
market model to predict normal returns. Excess returns are used to conduct the regression in 
order to eliminate the influence of the risk-free interest rate.  Depending on the stock market on 
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which the shares of the company are listed, we use the NYSE Composite Index, the NASDAQ 
Composite Index, the Nasdaq Capital Market Composite Index or the Amex Composite Index to 
calculate the market returns. As to the risk free rate, we use the interest rate of the three-month 
US Treasury bill.  
To get the parameter estimates of the market model, we run an Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) regression of the excess stock returns on the excess market returns using data 
from the estimation window: 
itmtiiit RR εβα ++=  
This can be expressed in matrix form: 
iiii XR εθ += , 
where: 
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Having computed the market-model parameter estimates, we proceed to calculate the 
abnormal returns over the event window: 
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 is a (7 x 2) matrix of market excess returns with a vector of ones in the first column.  
 
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡=
i
i
i β
αθ ˆ
ˆˆ  is the (2 x 1) parameter vector estimate from the estimation window. 
 
3.3 Testing and Comparing Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
In this section, we explain in detail how we calculate our test values and perform 
our statistical tests. Generally speaking, we will use both parametric and non-parametric tests 
to investigate two questions: 
Question 1: Are the abnormal returns significantly different from zero for the 
whole sample and for each of the groups (the “away from” and the “closer to” group)? 
Question 2: Are the abnormal returns of the “away from” group significantly 
different from those of the “closer to” group? 
To answer Question 1, we use standardized average cumulative abnormal 
returns as our parametric test statistics and sign test values as our non-parametric test statistics. 
To answer Question 2, we use the difference of the average cumulative 
abnormal returns for the two groups divided by its standard deviation as our parametric test 
statistics. As to our non-parametric test statistics, we use the Wilcoxon two-sample test value. 
As a general assumption for all our tests, we assume that the covariance of the 
average cumulative abnormal returns of the two groups is zero. In our opinion, this is a 
reasonable assumption to make, since our observations are widely distributed across different 
industries and most of the event windows do not overlap with each other.  
For the methodology used to calculate test values, we follow Campbell, Lo and 
MacKinlay (1997). We will first explain how we get our parametric test values and then the 
non-parametric test values. 
 
3.3.1 Parametric Tests 
To test the significance of the abnormal returns (Question 1), we conduct 
parametric tests. The tests involve three steps: Firstly, we aggregate the abnormal returns 
through time. Secondly, we standardize the cumulative abnormal returns. Thirdly, we 
aggregate the standardized cumulative abnormal returns across securities.  
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 Aggregation of abnormal returns through time 
Aggregation of abnormal returns through time for an individual security is done in 
the following way. We define )33( , +−iCAR as the cumulative abnormal return for security i 
from day t= -3 to day t= +3  
*'
, ˆ)33( iiCAR εγ=+−
∧
,  where is a (7 x 1) vector of ones. 'γ
 
Standardization of the cumulative abnormal returns 
Since ~ N(0, , we standardize it to get the 
standardized cumulative abnormal return. 
)33( , +−
∧
iCAR ))33( ,
2 +−iσ
)33(
)33(
)33(
,
,
, +−
+−=+−
∧
∧
i
i
i
CAR
SCAR σ ~N(0,1) 
The variance of the cumulative abnormal returns is calculated as shown below: 
=+−∧ ))33(( ,iCARVar )33( ,2 +−iσ = γγ iV' , 
where  
2*1*2 ')'(
ii iiiii
XXXXIV εε σσ −+=   
I  is a (7 x 7) identity matrix, 
iX  and  are the excess market return matrices from the estimation window and the event 
window, respectively, as they were defined in Section 3.2 . 
*
iX
  is used to substitute  ,  2iεσ
∧
2
iεσ
2140
12
−=
∧
iεσ 'ˆiε iεˆ , 
where iεˆ is the vector of residuals from the estimation window.  
 
Aggregation across securities 
We define )33( , +−SCAR  as the average cumulative abnormal return across 75 observations 
from day t = -3 to t = +3: 
)33( , +−SCAR = )33(75
1
,
75
1
+−∑
=
∧
i
iSCAR  ~ N(0, )4140(*75
2140
−
− ), 
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Therefore, our parametric test statistic for testing the significance of the abnormal returns for 
the whole sample will be: 
)33()
2140
)4140(*75( ,2
1
2 +−−
−= SCARJ ~N(0,1) 
Similarly, we calculate our test statistics for testing the significance of the abnormal returns 
for each group as follows: 
For the “closer to” group )33()
2140
)4140(*51( ,2
1
2 +−−
−= SCARJ ~N(0,1) 
 
For the “away from” group    )33()
2140
)4140(*24( ,2
1
2 +−−
−= SCARJ ~N(0,1) 
 
To compare the abnormal returns of the two groups (Question 2) we use the 
following test statistic, assuming zero covariance between the CARs of the two groups: 
)var()var()var( 21
21
21
21
3
CARCAR
CARCAR
CARCAR
CARCARJ
+
−=
−
−=  
where: 
∑
=
∧ +−=
24
1
,1 )33(24
1
i
iCARCAR denotes mean cum. abnormal return for the “away from” group 
2CAR ∑
=
∧ +−=
51
1
, )33(51
1
i
iCAR denotes mean cum. abnormal return for the “closer to” group 
()( 1 VarCARVar = ∑
=
∧ +−
24
1
, )33(24
1
i
iCAR )= ∑
=
∧ +−
24
1
,2 ))33(var(24
1
i
iCAR is the variance of the 
mean cumulative abnormal return for the “away from” group 
()( 2 VarCARVar = ∑
=
∧ +−
51
1
, )33(51
1
i
iCAR )= ∑
=
∧ +−
51
1
,2 ))33(var(51
1
i
iCAR is the variance of the 
mean cumulative abnormal return for the “closer to” group. 
 
3.3.2 Non-parametric Tests 
The sign test 
The sign test is used to test the significance of the cumulative abnormal returns 
(Question 1). This test is based on the assumption that the probability for the abnormal return 
to be either positive or negative is 50%.  The null hypothesis in our case is: H0: p≥0.5 while 
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the alternative is H1: p<0.5, where p is the probability that the cumulative abnormal return is 
positive. The test statistic is denoted as and calculated as: 4J
5,0
5.0
2
1
4
N
N
NJ ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −=
+
~N (0, 1) 
where  and  are the number of the positive abnormal returns and total abnormal returns, 
respectively.  
+N N
 
The Wilcoxon two-sample test 
Wilcoxon two-sample test is used to test whether the cumulative abnormal 
returns of the “closer to” group are significantly different from the cumulative abnormal 
returns of the “away from” group (Question 2). The Wilcoxon two-sample test is conducted in 
four steps: 
Firstly, we rank all the observations in the total sample from low to high. 
Secondly, we compute the Wilcoxon statistic as: 
∑−++= 22 )1( 2221
n
RnnnnC , 
where 
1n  is the number of observations in the group with more observations, 
2n  is the number of observations in the group with fewer observations,  
∑2n R is the sum of the ranks for the group with fewer observations.   
In our case =51, which is the total number of observations in the “closer to” group, and 
=24, which is the total number of observations in the “away from” group.  
1n
2n
  Thirdly, Cnn −  is calculated and compared with C. The larger one is chosen 
to be the input  for our final testing statistic. 
21
sU
  Fourthly, we compute our final testing statistic as:  
 
12
)1(
)
2
(
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21
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−
=
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3.4 Cross-Sectional Regression 
One drawback of the tests described in Section 3.3 is that they do not control for 
other offering characteristics that affect the abnormal returns. To take these other factors into 
account we will run the following cross-sectional regression using OLS: 
 
CAR(-3, +3) = α0 + α1CDE + α2 NET + α3COM + α4ΔSH + α5BAN + α6RUN + α7BUS+ ε 
 
Below follows a detailed discussion of each of the explanatory variables: 
 
Change in Leverage Relative to the Industry Median 
The CDE variable is defined in our data subsection. If CDE is positive the 
offering will move the firm’s leverage closer to the industry median, whereas if CDE is 
negative the offering will move the firm’s leverage away from the industry median. If 
industry D/E ratios are seen as desirable/optimal by investors, we would expect a positive 
coefficient for CDE.  
 NET is a dummy variable that takes the value 0 if CDE is negative and the value 
1 if CDE is positive. We would expect a positive sign for the coefficient of this variable as 
well. 
 
Combination Primary-Secondary Offerings 
COM is a dummy variable that takes the value 0 if the offering is not a 
combination offering and 1 if it is. In a combination primary-secondary offering, both the 
company and selling shareholders offer shares of stocks to the public.  
Leland and Pyle (1977) present an information asymmetry model according to 
which the entrepreneur’s/insider’s willingness to invest in his own project serves as a signal 
of project quality. In this model the value of the firm increases with the share of the firm held 
by insiders. Following this logic, we would expect combination offerings to have a worse 
announcement effect than non-combination equity offerings due to the fact that combination 
offerings reduce the insiders’ ownership share. Therefore, we would expect a negative sign 
for the coefficient of this variable.  
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Relative size of the Offering 
ΔSH is calculated by dividing the planned proceeds of the offering by the pre-
announcement market value of the firm’s common stock. We would expect a negative 
coefficient for this variable for two main reasons.  
Firstly, the larger the relative size of the offering, the larger will be the reduction 
in insiders’ ownership share, regardless of whether insiders are offering their shares for sale or 
not. Therefore, the model of Leland and Pyle, as discussed above, would predict a negative 
sign for the variable as well. Secondly, Krasker (1986) argues that in equity offerings, 
offering size is negatively correlated with price, due to the adverse selection problem.  
 
Bank Debt Reductions 
The variable BAN is a dummy variable that takes the value 0 if the debt being 
reduced is identified as bank debt and value 1 otherwise. We would expect a positive 
coefficient for this variable for the reasons outlined next.  
Because of the existence of an imperfect capital market, the information 
between insiders and outsiders is asymmetric. In this situation, banks play a unique role as a 
transmitter of information between firms and outside investors. Usually, banks have more 
access to the financial information of firms than outside investors, because of their special 
relationship as lenders. Outsiders tend to interpret announcements of bank debt reductions as 
unfavourable inside information. Hull and Moellenberndt (1994) found that the magnitude of 
the negative performance of stock returns following announcements of bank debt reductions 
is more than twice the magnitude observed for non-bank debt reductions. What is more, 
James (1987) found a larger positive effect on the stock price after the announcements of bank 
loan agreements compared to private placements or public debt offerings and a significantly 
negative effect on stock returns when firms used the proceeds from private placements or 
public debt offerings to pay down bank debt. 
 
Stock Performance Prior to the Offering 
RUN is a variable that captures the stock performance (run-up) prior to the 
offering. We have defined it as the stock’s cumulative excess return for the period stretching 
from day t = -120 to day t = -6. We would expect a negative coefficient for this variable.  
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As mentioned in the literature review section, managers tend to time the market; 
that is they issue equity when they think the firm’s stock is overvalued and repurchase it back 
when they think it is undervalued (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Lucas and McDonald, 1990). The 
amount of overvaluation is related to the abnormal return prior to the new issuance. A large 
run-up of the stock price before a new issuance means a large overvaluation of the stock and 
therefore a more negative response is expected (Choe,Masulis and Nanda,1993).  
 
Business Cycle 
 BUS is a dummy that takes the value 0 if the economy is in an expansionary 
period and the value 1 if the economy is in a contractionary period (recession). According to 
the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), the last business cycle trough in the U.S. 
was in November 2001, whereas the last business cycle peak was in December 2007. This 
means that our observations for the years 2004-2007 fall in an expansionary period, whereas 
the observations for the year 2008 fall in a contractionary period.  
Choe, Masulis and Nanda (1993) argue that equity offers in economic upturns 
are associated with smaller adverse selection effects, because in these times investment 
opportunities are more profitable and assets in place have greater value. On the other hand, 
they argue that, during recessions, the adverse selection effect increases, because new 
investment opportunities are less profitable and the uncertainty regarding the value of assets 
in place is greater. Therefore, we would expect a negative coefficient for the variable BUS.  
 
4. Presentation and Interpretation of the Empirical Results 
 In this section we present and interpret our empirical findings. Section 4.1 presents the 
results of testing and comparing cumulative abnormal returns (Section 3.3). Section 4.2 
presents the results of our cross-sectional regression (Section 3.4).  
 
4.1 Results of Parametric and Non-Parametric Tests 
Table 6 presents the results of our parametric and non-parametric tests on 7-day 
average cumulative abnormal returns: 
Table 6 Results from parametric and non-parametric tests 
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total sample closer to group away from group "away from" versus "closer to"group
(n=75) (n=51) (n=24)
Average of CAR -2,597% -2,108% -3,638% -1,531%
Parametric Tests J2=-4,463*** J2=-3,496*** J2=-2,793*** J3=-0,032
Non-parametric Tests J4=-4,041*** J4=-3,221*** J4=-2,449*** J5=-6,383***
***significant at 1% level
Event Days (-3,+3)
 
 
The results shown in the first three columns answer Question 1: whether the 
abnormal returns are significantly different from zero for the total sample and for each of the 
two groups.  
The first column of Table 6 shows that the 7-day average cumulative abnormal 
return for the total sample is negative (-2.6%). Using the parametric test (one tail z-test), we 
reject the null hypothesis that the average cumulative abnormal return for the total sample is 
zero at 1% significance level. Using the non-parametric test (sign test), we also reject the null 
hypothesis at 1% significance level. Since both the parametric and non-parametric test yield 
consistent results, our findings are quite robust statistically.  
The second column of Table 6 shows that the 7-day average cumulative 
abnormal return for the companies moving closer to the industry median leverage ratio is also 
negative (-2.1%). Using both the parametric test (one tail z-test) and non-parametric test (sign 
test), we again reject the null hypothesis that the average cumulative abnormal return for the 
“closer to” group is zero at 1% significance level. 
 Similarly, the third column of Table 6 shows that the 7-day average cumulative 
abnormal return for the companies moving away from the industry median leverage ratio is 
negative (-3.6%) and significant at 1% level using both tests. 
Therefore, we find that security offerings in which part of the proceeds are used 
to pay down debt are associated with significant negative announcement effects. This is 
consistent with information asymmetry models that predict negative stock price reaction to 
announcements of security issuances and prior empirical studies of seasoned equity offerings 
(Korwar and Masulis, 1986; Hull, 1999).  
The fourth column of Table 6 answers Question 2: whether the average 
cumulative abnormal return for the “closer to” group is significantly different from that of the 
“away from” group.  
As expected, the average cumulative abnormal return for the “away from” group 
(-3.6%) is more negative than that for the “closer to” group (-2.1%). If investors see industry 
median debt ratios as important benchmarks, we would indeed expect to see a more negative 
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stock price reaction for firms in the “away from” group compared to those in the “closer to” 
group. However, the parametric test cannot prove that the difference of the abnormal returns 
between the two groups is significant at the 1% level. On the other hand, the non-parametric 
test (The Wilcoxon two-sample test) strongly rejects the null hypothesis that the average 
cumulative abnormal returns for the two groups are equal to each other.  
Since the results of the parametric and non-parametric tests are inconsistent with 
each other, we are unable to conclude that the stock price reaction is significantly different for 
firms that move closer to the industry median as compared to firms that move away from the 
industry median. One explanation for the inconclusive results could be the fact that this way 
of testing, does not control for other factors that could affect the reaction to announcements of 
security offerings. This issue is addressed in the cross-sectional regression section.  
 
4.2 Results of the Cross-Sectional Regressions 
In this section we present and interpret the results of our cross-sectional 
regression of 7-day CARs on several explanatory variables. Table 7 shows the summary 
statistics for our main variables (excluding dummies), whereas Table 8 shows the correlation 
matrix for our explanatory variables: 
 
Table 7 Summary statistics for our main variables 
CAR 7-day CDE RUN ΔSH
Min. -25.88% -0.2783 -0.2883 1.32%
Max. 23.58% 0.8927 5.6535 113.51%
Mean -2.60% 0.1236 0.3591 20.75%
Median -4.61% 0.0802 0.2301 18.30%
St. Dev. 0.0876 0.2165 0.6891 0.1883  
 
Table 8 Correlation matrix for the explanatory variables 
 Correlation CDE NET COM RUN ΔSH BAN BUS
CDE 1 0.613712 -0.288289 -0.19638 0.656849 0.095399 -0.00433
NET 0.613712 1 -0.18334 -0.29605 0.105243 0.11779 0.09693
COM -0.28829 -0.18334 1 0.018491 -0.28481 0.025031 -0.11822
RUN -0.19638 -0.29605 0.018491 1 -0.09236 0.030374 -0.00215
ΔSH 0.656849 0.105243 -0.284805 -0.09236 1 0.081204 0.081625
BAN 0.095399 0.11779 0.025031 0.030374 0.081204 1 -0.05063
BUS -0.00433 0.09693 -0.118217 -0.00215 0.081625 -0.05063 1  
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We notice a high correlation between the variables CDE and NET (0.614). This 
is not surprising considering the way in which the variable NET is defined. To circumvent 
this problem, we will not include both variables in the same regression.  
The correlation between CDE and ΔSH is also high (0.657). We would rather 
not exclude any of these two variables from the regression, because each one of them contains 
important information about the offerings. Therefore, to mitigate the problem, we 
orthogonalize CDE with respect to ΔSH. We run the following regression: 
 
CDEi = α + βΔSHi + εi for i = 1, 2, …75 
and we defined the orthogonalized CDE (CDEo) as follows:  
CDEio = α + εi  for i = 1, 2, …75 
 
Table A1 in the appendix shows the results of four regressions of the 7-day 
CARs on several explanatory variables. In the first regression, the variable NET is not 
included. In the second regression, the variable CDEo is used instead of CDE. In the third 
regression, the variable NET is included while CDE is left out. Lastly, in the fourth 
regression, neither CDE nor NET are included. Table A2 in the appendix shows some 
diagnostic tests for each of the four regressions. According to the Bera-Jarque test, the 
residuals are normally distributed. Using White’s test, we find no evidence of 
heteroscedasticity. 
As expected the coefficients for CDE and CDEo are positive and significant at 
the 5% level. The positive coefficient shows that the stock reaction is less negative when 
offerings move the firm’s leverage “closer to” the industry median, compared to offerings that 
move the firm’s leverage “away from” the industry median. In addition to this, we notice that 
the inclusion of CDE or CDEo in the regression does increase the explanatory power of the 
regression (adjusted R2 increases from 7.6% in the fourth regression to 11.6% in the first and 
second regressions). This finding further supports the argument that change in the D/E ratio 
relative to the industry median is significant in determining the abnormal return that results 
from an offering announcement. These findings are in accordance with the findings of Hull 
(1999). 
 We now turn our attention to the dummy variable NET. As was described 
earlier, this variable captures the sign of the variable CDE.  We notice that the coefficient of 
NET is positive but insignificant. We also note that its inclusion in the regression does not 
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increase the adjusted R2 of the regression. Trying to reconcile these insignificant findings 
about NET with the significant ones about CDE, we conclude that in order to explain the 
stock price reaction, both magnitude and direction of the change in leverage relative to the 
industry median must be taken into account.  
The COM and BAN variables appear to be statistically insignificant, although 
the signs of their coefficients are as predicted by theory (negative and positive, respectively). 
The sign of the coefficient of the RUN variable is unexpected.  The coefficient 
is positive and significant at the 10% level. This means that the better the performance prior to 
the announcement of the offering, the better will be the stock price reaction to the offering. 
This finding contradicts market timing theory and some earlier empirical studies such as Hull 
(1999) and Korwar and Masulis (1986). Even if we measure stock price run-up over a longer 
period (day –250 to day –6) the sign of the coefficient of the redefined variable (RUN250) 
remains positive (see Table A3 in the appendix).  
The ΔSH variable, as expected has a negative and significant coefficient at the 
10% level. This means that the larger the relative size of the offering the more negative will 
be the abnormal returns. This is in accordance with the model of Leland and Pyle (1977) 
about insider ownership and the arguments of Krasker (1986) about adverse selection. 
However, we notice that when CDE is orthogonalized the coefficient for ΔSH becomes 
insignificant.  
The results for the business cycle variable BUS are unexpected. The coefficient 
of this variable is significant at the 5% level, but its sign is positive. This means that offerings 
during contractionary periods have a less negative announcement effect, compared to 
offerings during expansionary periods. However, according to Choe, Masulis and Nanda 
(1993), the sign for the coefficient of this variable should have been negative. We tried 
substituting the dummy variable BUS with other variables that might capture the business 
cycle effects. This was done to check how sensitive our results were to the way we defined 
this variable. We ran regressions using the following variables instead of BUS: 
• IPI - The growth of the Industrial Production Index over the 3-month period prior to 
the announcement (Source: Federal Reserve) 
• GDP – The real growth in Gross Domestic Product over the last quarter prior to the 
announcement (Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis) 
• LEAD – the growth in the Conference Board Leading Economic Indicators Index over 
the 3-month period prior to the announcement (Source: Datastream) 
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• COIN – The growth in the Conference Board Coincident Indicators Index over the 3-
month period prior to the announcement (Source: Datastream) 
However, in each of the cases the substitute variable was statistically 
insignificant in the regression (Table A4 in the appendix summarizes these regressions). We 
therefore conclude that the BUS dummy variable is indeed the most reasonable choice to 
capture the business cycle effects. One possible explanation for the unexpected sign of our 
BUS coefficient is that the contractionary period in our sample (2008) corresponds to the 
global financial crisis which made it very difficult for companies to raise capital. Therefore, 
the fact that a company was able to access the public capital markets under such difficult 
conditions could have been seen as a positive signal by investors.  
 
5. Conclusions 
The main theme of our thesis was to investigate the link between industry 
leverage ratios and stock price performance. This was achieved by studying the stock price 
reaction to announcements of seasoned equity offerings, which cause the D/E ratios of firms 
to change relative to the industry median.  
Like previous studies, we find that seasoned equity offerings are associated with 
significant negative abnormal returns upon announcement. This finding is consistent with 
information asymmetry theory.  
When comparing the abnormal returns for firms moving their leverage ratios 
closer to the industry median against those for firms moving away from the industry median, 
we find insignificant differences. However, after controlling for other offering characteristics, 
we do find that the abnormal returns are less negative for firms moving closer to the industry 
median compared to those moving away from it. This means that investors do consider 
industry median D/E ratios as important benchmarks for the companies in a certain industry. 
Taking this one step further, we could argue that our findings provide support for those capital 
structure theories that argue for the existence of an optimal capital structure.  
In addition, using cross-sectional regression, we make some interesting findings 
about other offering characteristics that affect abnormal returns associated with security 
offerings.  
We find that stock price performance prior to an equity offering is positively 
related to the abnormal returns caused by the announcement of the offering, which contradicts 
market-timing theory. We also find that abnormal returns are less negative for offerings that 
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take place during economic downturns compared to those during economic upturns. This 
finding contradicts an earlier study by Choe, Masulis and Nanda (1993). In addition, we find 
that the kind of debt (bank debt or not) being reduced and the type of equity offering 
(combination or not) do not play a significant role in determining abnormal returns. Lastly, as 
predicted by theory, we find that the relative size of the issuance is negatively related to 
abnormal returns.  
In our opinion, future research should continue to explore the links between 
industry leverage ratios and stock price performance. In particular, it would be of interest to 
investigate whether the significance of industry leverage ratios is greater for certain industry 
groups.  
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 Appendix 
 
Figure A1 Performance of the composite market indices 
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Figure A1 Performance of the composite market indices (continued) 
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Table A1 Regression results 
Constant CDE CDEo NET COM RUN ΔSH BAN BUS F-statistic R2 Adjusted R2
Coefficient -0.012686 0.123022 -0.023583 0.026437 -0.171701 0.015269 0.081906 2.613269** 0.187377 0.115675
t-statistic (-0.595034) (2.027356)** (-1.163918) (1.859137)*(-2.507364)** -0.679308 (2.303712)**
Coefficient -0.012686 0.123022 -0.023583 0.026437 -0.078806 0.015269 0.081906 2.613269** 0.187377 0.115675
t-statistic (-0.595034) (2.027356)** (-1.163918) (1.859137)* (-1.467641) -0.679308 (2.303712)**
Coefficient -0.024853 0.018609 -0.027066 0.0248 -0.085877 0.015621 0.072814 1.949703* 0.146781 0.071497
t-statistic (-0.885065) -0.824162 (-1.300506) -1.651136 (-1.563477) -0.672848 (1.999024)**
Coefficient -0.010279 -0.029988 0.02105 -0.085297 0.018348 0.075444 2.214088* 0.138259 0.075814
t-statistic (-0.472323) (-1.465718) -1.474003 (-1.556668) -0.800277 (2.08409)**
** Significant at the 5% level
*  Significant at the 10% level  
 
 
 
 
Table A2 Diagnostic tests for the four regressions above 
 
  
Bera-Jarque Test      
(distribution of the residuals) White Heteroscedasticity Test 
Regression Test Statistic Prob. F-statistic Prob. (F) LM Prob. (Chi square) 
Regression 1 4,410583 0,110218 1,139757 0,348518 10,22267 0,332761 
Regression 2 4,410583 0,110218 1,067237 0,398669 9,65597 0,379047 
Regression 3 1,863903 0,393784 1,00648 0,43983 8,154938 0,418484 
Regression 4 1,617069 0,445511 1,282109 0,272622 8,859618 0,262893 
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 Table A3 Regression result using alternative variables for stock price run-up 
Constant CDEo COM RUN RUN250 SH BAN BUS F-statistic R2 Adjusted R2
Coefficient -0.012686 0.123022 -0.023583 0.026437 -0.078806 0.015269 0.081906 2.613269** 0.187377 0.115675
t-statistic (-0.595034) (2.027356)** (-1.163918) (1.859137)* (-1.467641) (0.679308) (2.303712)**
Coefficient -0.005684 0.109439 -0.025779 0.011202 -0.089008 0.015832 0.082825 2.075373* 0.154778 0.0802
t-statistic (-0.264889) (1.78087)* (-1.247274) (0.836924) (-1.634162) (0.689238) (2.281169)**
** Significant at the 5% level
*  Significant at the 10% level
 
 
Table A4 Regression result using alternative variables for business cycle 
Constant CDEo COM RUN SH BAN BUS IPI GDP LEAD COIN F-statistic R2 Adjusted R2
Coefficient -0.012686 0.123022 -0.023583 0.026437 -0.078806 0.015269 0.081906 2.613269** 0.187377 0.115675
t-statistic (-0.595034) (2.027356)** (-1.163918) (1.859137)* (-1.467641) (0.679308) (2.303712)**
Coefficient -0.004703 0.110899 -0.028858 0.026075 -0.07326 0.012907 0.098887 1.604938 0.124046 0.046756
t-statistic (-0.212819) (1.76207)* (-1.372713) (1.765749)* (-1.304378) (0.553417) (0.083842)
Coefficient 0.026457 0.119937 -0.030849 0.026705 -0.070113 0.014002 -4.444956 1.888738* 0.142847 0.067216
t-statistic (0.797157) (1.91751)* (-1.485904) (1.827612)* (-1.27208) (0.606664) (-1.224238)
Coefficient 0.002212 0.103423 -0.0244 0.024896 -0.075574 0.015942 -1.080283 1.783551 0.135974 0.059736
t-statistic (0.097364) (1.648413) (-1.149383) (1.691943)* (-1.364629) (0.682157) (-0.972558)
Coefficient 0.003573 0.108915 -0.025994 0.023301 -0.069935 0.013073 -1.884217 1.735252 0.13278 0.056261
t-statistic (0.150513) (1.74367)* (-1.234603) (1.546159) (-1.260162) (0.563577) (-0.831862)
** Significant at the 5% level
*  Significant at the 10% level  
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